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 The Logic of ADHD: 
a brief review of fallacious reasoning 
 
Gordon Tait, QUT 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper has two central purposes: the first is to survey some of the more important examples 
of fallacious argument, and the second is to examine the frequent use of these fallacies in 
support of the psychological construct: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).   
The paper divides twelve familiar fallacies into three different categories—material, 
psychological and logical—and contends that advocates of ADHD often seem to employ these 
fallacies to support their position.  It is suggested that all researchers, whether into ADHD or 
otherwise, need to pay much closer attention to the construction of their arguments if they are 
not to make truth claims unsupported by satisfactory evidence, form or logic. 
  
Introduction 
 
Until this paper, I have always managed to avoid writing in the first person.  This is not to 
denigrate those who do, rather it is simply a personal choice, and perhaps reflex deference to 
one of the more suspect pillars of modernism, that of objectivity.  However, it seems 
appropriate here, since the origins of my interest in this topic are not solely academic, and 
since, upon re-examination, I have also been guilty of what can only be described as dodgy 
logic in some of my previous writing.  It would be unfortunate if this article was interpreted, 
not as an exegesis on various forms of fallacious argument, and as a set of ongoing concerns 
over the logic of ADHD, but rather as the smug view from the intellectual high-ground.   This 
is not intended to be the case. 
 
My initial concerns over faulty argument began with the purchase of Australian cable TV, 
obtained with the primary intention of watching as much English soccer as possible.  As part of 
the package came a number of American news channels.  A nebulous interest in American 
politics soon found me transfixed by Fox News, an entertaining, but relentlessly and 
shamelessly partisan, conservative network.  Across a range of programs, I soon found myself 
lead—seemingly by reasoned argument—to conclusions that surprised me (to put it mildly), or 
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to a number of political positions that I most certainly did not hold, or to caricatures of those 
that I did.  To mention but a few, loosely remembered, examples:  
 
 ‘Either you are for us, or against us’ (and therefore, by implication, a supporter of 
terrorism); 
‘Is it a good thing that Saddam Hussein is no longer in power?’ ‘Yes?’ ‘Then clearly you 
support the invasion of Iraq’. 
 
After a little head-scratching, I realised both these claims were simply examples of a false 
dichotomy (see fallacy No. 4).  In neither case are they the only possible options. 
 
 ‘Gun laws stop law-abiding citizens protecting themselves, while criminals get weapons 
anyway.  If all the students at Virginia Tech had carried weapons, the killer would have 
been shot the after the first couple of murders.’ 
 
This mind-boggling argument is an example of a number of fallacies, but most notably the 
Post-Hoc fallacy (see fallacy No.2), ie. incident follows gun laws, therefore gun laws cause 
incident. 
 
 ‘The ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), with its support for NAMBLA (National 
American Man-Boy Love Association), demonstrates the moral bankruptcy at the heart of 
the far-left liberal agenda.’ 
 
This is an instance of the Straw Man fallacy (see fallacy No. 8).  The ‘liberal agenda’ is 
attacked through the medium of a ludicrously indefensible exemplar. 
 
My interest in fallacious argument having been triggered by Fox News, I now found myself 
applying this reasoning to my ongoing academic research.  I have been publishing on my 
ontological, epistemological and pedagogic dissatisfaction with the psychological construct of 
ADHD for nearly a decade.  Consequently, I recently reviewed a number of arguments in 
support of ADHD that I had come across in various books, journals and web-sites.  Given my 
scepticism regarding the disorder, it is perhaps not surprising that I found a treasure-trove of 
truly awful argument.  Indeed, it will be a contention of this paper that some of the most 
important arguments in support of the notion of ADHD are fallacious.      
 
The purpose of this paper is therefore twofold: the first is to review twelve of the more 
important examples of fallacious argument, an area of study once regarded as crucial to a good 
education, but now largely neglected.  The second purpose is to examine the use of these 
fallacies to provide not only the logical foundation of ADHD, but also much of its intellectual 
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superstructure.   However, before addressing the notion of fallacy directly, it is probably 
advisable to place my concerns over ADHD into some kind of intellectual context. 
 
 
The ADHD Debate 
 
ADHD first emerged as a discreet disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III) 
of the American Psychiatric Association in 1987.  From this starting point, its popularity as a 
diagnosis has grown exponentially.  With its symptoms of fidgeting, excitability, impulsivity, 
and lack of self control, current estimates of the prevalence of ADHD vary widely, but in some 
schooling populations the figure stands in excess of 10%.  This new category of human 
existence has engendered a significant amount of controversy and disagreement within 
medical, psychological, academic and educational communities, with a number of distinct 
positions emerging. 
 
The first grouping is comprised of ADHD advocates.  There is now a huge literature on all 
conceivable aspects of the disorder, including its aetiology, central characteristics, and 
methodologies for intervention.  Not only does this grouping regard ADHD to be an objective 
fact of nature, and hence in existence long before sharp-eyed psychologists first managed to 
give it a name, but they also largely appear to believe that ADHD is still under-diagnosed in 
the general population.  The lack of supporting physiological evidence for the disorder is not 
regarded as a particular problem.  A second position—essentially a sub-set of the first—is 
comprised of those who consider that, while ADHD may have been significantly over-
diagnosed, there is still some grain of ontological truth to the disorder.  Clearly, they argue, a 
few children exhibit symptoms of extravagant hyperactivity, and it is these individuals who 
truly belong within the boundaries of the disorder.  The sub-text here is that surely large 
numbers of doctors, psychologists and pharmaceutical companies couldn’t be completely 
wrong.      
 
An alternative position rejects the ‘objective’ status of ADHD.  There is a growing body of 
work which remains unhappy with the arguments offered by the first two groups, a 
dissatisfaction that takes a number of forms.  Some writers have argued that ADHD is a fraud 
perpetrated by multi-national, Ritalin-manufacturing drug companies, eager to make gigantic 
profits irrespective of the dubious ethics involved in pathologising large swathes of the 
schooling population (Magill-Lewis, 2000).  A similar, but less strident form of the same 
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position, contends that ADHD is simply a mistake, an amalgam of normal childhood 
behaviours.   In what constitutes the most popular critique of the disorder, it is often argued 
that ADHD is simply a disorganised jumble of often-contradictory characteristics and causes, 
none of which validly cohere into any kind of consistent entity (Goodman, 1992).  To put it 
another way, simply being towards the end of the normal curve on a diverse range of 
behavioural issues, does not suddenly make you sick. 
 
While still challenging the notion that ADHD exists independently of human assessment and 
organisation, my own work in the area has largely taken a different approach.  My central 
thesis is not that ADHD is a fraud or a mistake, rather that it is an artefact of governance, the 
product of a new set of truth-claims that sought to manage the conduct of specific populations.  
I argue that the arrival of increasing numbers of behaviour disorders has far more to do with 
the governmental imperatives to individuate, differentiate and normalise school children, than 
it has to do with the abilities of psychologists to discover more and more ‘natural’ forms of 
human difference (Tait, 2001).  That is, by sub-dividing the population into an exponentially 
increasing number of categories, it becomes possible to regulate conduct to an ever-finer 
degree.  This does not just include the most obvious external manifestations of docility and 
discipline (Foucault, 1977), but also the smallest workings of the human mind (Rose, 1990). 
 
Although still part of my ongoing dissatisfaction with ADHD, this paper is not about 
governance.  It is rather a more direct critique of the kinds of argument that advocates of 
ADHD use to prop up their position.  If this entity is to be cemented as an objective fact of 
nature, as its devotees claim it should, then in the absence of any concrete physiological 
evidence of its existence, it will be the strength and logic of its supporting arguments that will 
ultimately decide its epistemological fate.  I will argue here that many of these arguments are 
fallacious.              
 
What is fallacy? 
 
The word ‘fallacy’ has a number of meanings, largely dependant upon context.  While fallacy 
can simply refer to any discourse of an incorrect or misleading nature, for the purposes of this 
paper, it also refers more specifically to a situation where a given discussion purports to obey 
the conventions of valid argument, but is actually unsuccessful in doing so.  Therefore, a 
fallacy is, simply put, an error in reasoning.    
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Arguments generally come in two forms, deductive and inductive.  A deductive argument is 
one where the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusions.  Perhaps the most 
familiar form of this type of reasoning is Aristotle’s syllogism, most commonly written as: 
 
 All A is B, (premise) 
  All B is C,  (premise) 
So, All A is C (conclusion) 
 
And an example might be: 
 
 All hyperactive children have ADHD,  
 All those with ADHD need Ritalin,  
So, All hyperactive children need Ritalin.  
 
This argument is valid, in that its premises provide the necessary support for the conclusion.  
Of course, the question here is whether the argument is also sound, since for an argument to be 
sound as well as valid, it must also have true premises.  I would suggest that the above 
premises are highly suspect—even in the most ADHD-obsessed parts of the world—and  
consequently, the argument is most likely to be regarded as unsound, but not fallacious.  
 
However, a deductive fallacy (also called a formal fallacy) is an argument with an invalid 
form, as below:   
 
 All A is C,   
 All B is C,   
So, All A is B   
 
And an example might be: 
 
All children can be naughty,    
All those with ADHD can be naughty,  
So, All children can have ADHD.   
 
The conclusion to this argument may well be true (assuming you accept the notion of ADHD), 
and the premises may well be true, however those premises do not lead to the conclusion, and 
consequently the argument is neither sound nor valid.  This paper will address a number of 
such formal, deductive fallacies of logic. 
 
The main alternative to this form of reasoning is inductive argument.  Inductive logic asserts 
that if something is true for ‘n’ examples of a given occurrence (when ‘n’ is a sufficiently large 
number), then it can be assumed to be true for the occurrence: n+1.  This form of logic is based 
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less in certainty, and more on likelihood.  Validity and truth are not deduced inexorably from 
the form of the argument and the veracity of the premises, rather an inductive argument is 
regarded as strong if the truth of the premises make it likely that the conclusion is also true—
never certain, but likely.  Inductive reasoning may take the form: 
 
 Almost all A are B  
 All B is C   
So, A is C.    
 
And an example might be: 
  
Almost all children diagnosed with ADHD take Ritalin,    
 Joe has ADHD,       
So, Joe takes Ritalin       
 
This could be regarded as a relatively strong inductive argument, and therefore not fallacious.  
When flaws in reasoning occur in this type of logic, they are called informal fallacies.  These 
include any number of errors, irrelevancies, inconsistencies and weaknesses that render the 
argument invalid.   One form of this is: 
 
 A few A are B   
 All B is C   
So, A is C.    
 
And an example might be. 
  
A few children have ADHD   
 Joe is a child,     
So, Joe has ADHD.    
 
As previously mentioned, this paper will address twelve different types of fallacious reasoning, 
employing examples from ADHD research.  These types will include both deductive and 
inductive arguments, and yet the rest of the paper has not been broken down according to this 
neat bifurcation—unfortunately—as the field has always been regarded as considerably more 
complex than that.   
 
A number of philosophers have attempted to create explanatory models for understanding and 
organising different types of fallacy.  The first, and probably the most influential, belongs to 
Aristotle, although other noted thinkers have also sought to construct their own systems, each 
an attempt produce a definitive guide to the crucial intellectual task of spotting phoney 
arguments.  These include works by Bacon (1620), Bentham (1824), and Mill (1843), to 
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mention but a few.  Each of these could have provided the template for this article, however the 
structure chosen comes from a more modern, and somewhat more prosaic, source.  In the book, 
Fallacy: the counterfeit of argument, Fearnside and Holther (1959: 3-4) outline an effective 
three-part typology which, due to its simplicity and accessibility, will be employed here.  The 
classificatory heads are Material Fallacies, Psychological Fallacies, and Logical Fallacies, and 
the twelve specific fallacies addressed in this paper are evenly distributed between them, 
although not all are referred to directly in the above text, and come instead from a number of 
other sources.  The three-part model simply provides the best vehicle for their effective 
analysis.   
 
The authors explain the functioning of this typology by utilising the analogy of a 
manufacturing process, one comprised of raw materials, an operator, and a machine.  If all 
three elements work as intended, the end product will be satisfactory (ie. a valid, sound and/or 
strong argument).   
 
However, three kinds of things can go wrong. The materials can be below standard or 
poorly prepared.  The operator can make a mistake—get sleepy or be distracted and 
turn the wrong knob.  And the machine itself can break down or misfunction (sic).  In 
any of these cases, the product probably will not pass inspection.  If the trouble lies 
with the material, we call it material; if with the operator, we call it psychological; if 
with the machine, then logical. (Fearnside & Holther 1959: 4) 
 
This is not an exact science.  These classifications are meant solely to help with the 
process of understanding faulty argument, and they are neither definitive nor immutable.  
Indeed, several of the fallacies could be allocated to one of the other heads without 
stretching the logic of the system too much.  That aside, I will take the three heads in 
turn: 
A) Material Fallacies 
 
An argument is a step up from a simple assertion, in that it purports to prove the claims 
made.  The argument generally emerges as the end product of a couple of premises and a 
resulting conclusion.  These premises should not magically appear out of the ether, but 
should rather be true—that is, factual—in that they are supported by appropriate 
evidence.  After all, premises can mean no more than the evidence supporting them, since 
no more can come out of an argument than goes in at the beginning.  The issue eventually 
comes down to the question of whether the evidence is accurately represented in the 
premises, and whether those premises are clear and intelligible. (Fearnside and Holther 
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1959: 9).  In those arguments where this is not the case, material fallacies are likely to 
occur.   
 
Of the four material fallacies discussed here—the Golden Mean fallacy, the False Cause 
fallacy, the Weak Analogy fallacy, and the False Dichotomy fallacy—not all are 
addressed by Fearnside and Holther (as previously mentioned), but each is particularly 
relevant to the kinds of faulty argument most frequently found in ADHD research and 
commentary. 
 
1) Golden Mean Fallacy 
 
 Either A or B. 
So ½ A, ½ B. 
 
This fallacy is based upon the pre-existence of two contrary, or widely divergent, 
positions.  Faced with the difficulty of choosing between those positions, a compromise 
solution is reached when both elements are incorporated into the conclusion.  This 
argument is a fallacy since nothing in the premises provides any support for that 
conclusion.   
 
It is estimated that 1 – 12% of school age children are affected by ADHD, with 
3% the consensus estimate.  (Woodrich 1994: 13)   
 
Descriptions of the prevalence of ADHD almost always begin with an account of the 
broadest range of estimates, from the lowest to the highest, often up to fifteen percent 
apart.  A mid-range figure is then inevitably suggested as the truth, which then seems like 
a reasonable compromise.  I am frequently faced with variants of this argument in student 
assignments, ie. ‘Some writers reject ADHD altogether, many others point to a massive 
over-diagnosis of the disorder, so the truth probably lies somewhere between the two’.  
This appears to be a perfectly logical settlement of the issue, especially to education 
students writing for a lecturer who appears to regard ADHD as an artefact of governance, 
and library shelves full of books teaching them how to identify, manage, and teach the 
thousands of ‘sick’ children waiting for them in classrooms.  Unfortunately, academic 
truth is not (or should not be) organised according to political compromise, and wishing 
something to be so provides a poor foundation for an argument.  Furthermore, this is not 
really even a compromise, since ADHD sceptics would be forced to concede the 
existence of the disorder, while advocates would merely need to trim their projections 
somewhat. 
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2) False Cause Fallacy (Post Hoc) 
 
 A then B 
So, A caused B 
 
This is also widely known as ‘Post hoc, ergo propter hoc’ (after this, therefore because of 
this).  There is the temptation to assume that simply because one event follows another, 
that they are somehow causally linked.  This is a frequent mistake, and forms the basis for 
one of the most common of all fallacies.  Of course, there can be a causal relationship 
between different events, however the existence of this relationship requires supporting 
evidence, not simply the weight of implication gained by placing them together in the 
same sentence. 
 
We know some of them by labels such as ‘defendant’, ‘probationer’, ‘parolee’, or 
‘inmate’—people who end up in our country’s criminal justice system with a 
highly treatable but often overlooked disability: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD).  In fact, an astonishing 30 to 70 percent of inmates may have 
ADHD. (Hurley & Eme 2004: i) 
  
The implication here is fairly clear: 
 
 Joe has ADHD, then Joe goes to Jail, 
So, Joe’s ADHD caused Joe to go to Jail. 
 
Most sociologists and criminologists would argue that incarceration is the end result of a 
complex mosaic of social forces—gender, social class, age, ethnicity, location, family 
history, local cultural customs and expectations, policing practices—all of which 
contribute to this outcome.  This is a common form of logic within ADHD commentary: 
ie. ADHD is the root cause of so much harm … had we but known … it all makes sense 
now.   
 
Problems with causality in this area also frequently takes the form: ‘classrooms were in 
chaos, we discovered ADHD (read: Ritalin): things are better’.  All the elements of this 
statement, not only those relating to causality, but also to validity, factuality and morality, 
are questionable.    
 
3) Weak Analogy Fallacy 
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 A is the same as B – for property 1 
 A is the same as B – for property 2 
So, A must be the same as B for property 3. 
 
An analogy is the claim that if two ideas, things, or circumstances are alike in a number 
of ways, then they will be alike in some further way—a way that normally suits the 
purposes of the proposition.   A strong analogy exists where the two elements are 
sufficiently similar in relevant respects, and a weak analogy is made when they are not.  
For example, the statement: ‘The Beatles are just like Mozart’ is analogy probably 
structured according to the following class characteristics:  
 
 The Beatles are the same as Mozart – both made music 
 The Beatles are the same as Mozart – both were very successful 
So, The Beatles are the same as Mozart – in that Mozart is still regarded as great centuries 
later, so will be the Beatles. 
 
Arguably, this is a strong analogy if you like the Beatles and/or come from Liverpool, and 
a weak analogy if you do not (or do not like Mozart).   
 
ADHD is frequently explained through the use of analogy.  In fact, it is an exceptionally 
fertile field for imaginative comparisons: a spinning top, a leaky canoe, a conductor-less 
orchestra, a badly-manufactured car, a radio with static, a smoke-filled burning house … 
and all from just one source (Hurley & Eme 2004).  However, the analogy with objective 
physical disease is by far the most common. 
 
Parents and teachers tend to think that there is nothing wrong with the child and 
that all he needs is a good whack.  Well, no matter how much you whack him, he 
is not going to get better.  The analogy is someone with diabetes.  If you whack 
him, is his diabetes going to get better?  There is a biological cause for ADHD. 
(Yong Tiam Ku 2006: 3) 
 
The logic here is straightforward: 
 
 ADHD is like Diabetes – both are undesirable 
ADHD is like Diabetes – both are abnormal states of health 
So, ADHD is like Diabetes – in that Diabetes is an objective, uncontested, observable fact 
of nature, deserving of no moral condemnation, so is ADHD. 
 
ADHD is often compared to a wide range of common, unproblematic illnesses and 
diseases, everything from pneumonia to mumps.  However, this is ultimately a weak 
analogy which attempts to mask a significant problem with the psychological construct of 
ADHD, in that there appears to be no objective physical evidence for its existence at all—
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‘no physical symptoms, no neurological signs, and no blood tests’ (Breggin 1998: 141-
142).     
 
 
4) False Dichotomy Fallacy 
 
 Either A or B, 
 Clearly not A, 
So, B 
 
A dichotomy is simply a choice between two alternatives.  This common situation 
becomes a fallacy under two particular circumstances.  The first is where the choice is 
largely rhetorical: ‘Either we attempt to escape, or we are executed in the morning’.  Not 
much of a dilemma really.  The second circumstance is where there are actually a number 
of other choices which have been left out of the equation.  In most cases, the false 
dichotomy fallacy involves both, that is, a simplification of the field into two choices, and 
the presentation of one of those choices as completely undesirable. 
 
Ask the medical expert: Larry Silver, M.D. 
The Consequences of Untreated ADHD 
Q: ‘I have a 22-year-old son who was diagnosed with ADHD when he was 8.  We did 
not have him put on Ritalin.  Now he is self-medicating and in trouble.  What can I 
do? 
A: Sadly, your son illustrates what may happen when someone has a neurologically 
based disorder (ADHD) and is not treated.  I do not know why he was not put on 
medication … (Silver 2008, ADDitude website) 
 
This logic is particularly common within ADHD commentary, particularly, it seems, from 
doctors.  What can be a very complex problem is distilled down to two simple alternatives 
ie. take Ritalin, or become a drug-taking criminal.  Clearly, as one of these options is 
spectacularly undesirable, the taking of Ritalin is not only logical, it is all-but necessary.  
This argument can be seen across a range of different contexts, but always with the same 
fallacy firmly in place: it’s either Ritalin or a chaotic classroom, Ritalin or a dysfunctional 
family. 
 
This is not a real dilemma.  The alternative is so disagreeable as to be redundant, and it 
also neglects all the other options available to the good teacher or the good parent, options 
which remain viable for addressing specific kinds of unwanted behaviour.  This is the 
case whether ADHD is accepted as a valid disorder or not.     
 
 12 
B) Psychological Fallacies 
 
Here is another trick which, as soon as it is practicable, makes all others 
unnecessary.  Instead of working on your opponent’s intellect by argument, work 
on his will by motive, and he, and also the audience if they have similar interests, 
will at once be won over by your opinion, even though you got it out of a lunatic 
asylum. (Schopenhauer 1896: XXXV) 
 
It would be tempting to think that this type of fallacy has a significantly lesser role to play 
within scholastic writing than it does on Fox News, and to some extent, this is true.  
Certainly, familiar illegitimate strategies of argument, such as those based around 
ridicule, or simply shouting the loudest, generally do have limited currency within 
academic discourse (except at conferences).  However, there is a wide variety of other 
fallacies which can be found within more serious writing that have the same effect.  These 
fallacies play up the rhetorical elements of an argument, employing anything from 
distraction and obfuscation, to emotional leverage and appeals to populism.    
 
The four fallacies outlined here—the Ad-Populum fallacy, the Ad-Hominem fallacy, the 
Red Herring fallacy, and the Straw Man fallacy—are all exceptionally common flaws in 
argument.  Once again, ADHD commentary and research has proved to be an 
exceptionally fertile source of examples.    
 
5) Ad-Populum Fallacy 
 
 A believes X 
 B believes X 
So, C ought to believe X 
 
An argument is fallacious if the basis for its validity rests solely on the fact that, since 
some other people regard something to be true, then so should you.  Truth is not simply a 
popularity poll.  At some point, some kind of assessment of evidence is required in order 
to weigh up the validity of the argument.  Weight of numbers, in the absence of 
satisfactory supporting evidence, is no argument at all.  
 
Of course, it has been suggested, and probably fairly convincingly, that scientific 
knowledge is actually a numbers game, and that the position which can muster the 
greatest quantity of powerful supporters is likely to be regarded as the truth—leaving 
aside, for the purposes of this paper, more complex debates about power/knowledge 
(Foucault 1977), correspondence theories of truth (Russell 1912), and/or falsifiability 
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(Popper 1963).  However, such scientific positions still require persuasive evidence to 
achieve, and maintain, intellectual ascendancy. 
 
In Australia the use of medication approaches 1 per 100 school children and in 
North America is even as high as 3-5 per 100.  It would therefore appear that, in 
the UK, very few children are being effectively managed medically at the 
moment, for what is essentially a medical condition. (Kewley 1999: 27) 
 
This is not an analysis of available evidence, instead the above quotation can simply be 
paraphrased as: Australians believe in ADHD, Americans believe in ADHD, therefore 
those in the UK ought to believe in ADHD.  This, in and of itself, is not a valid argument, 
but it is very common within ADHD commentary.  Interestingly, given medication rates, 
the argument could equally have been: Germans do not believe in ADHD, the French do 
not believe in ADHD, therefore clearly those in the UK currently believe in ADHD too 
much.   
 
6) Ad Hominem Fallacy 
 
 A believes X, 
 B believes Y, 
 A is an idiot, 
So, Y is true. 
 
The truth or falsity of any given argument does not hinge upon who makes that argument.  
When assessing whether deductive or inductive argument is valid, sound, or strong, no 
account should be taken of whether that person has appalling politics, or isn’t very clever, 
or doesn’t wash, and then a decision made that, actually, the conclusion is not supported 
by those premises after all.  However, this fallacy is probably the most familiar, 
frequently used, and effective of all.   
 
Ad Hominem fallacies come in a number of forms, from the basic: ‘Your argument is 
false, because you an idiot/bad’, through the ‘tu quoque’ fallacy: ‘Your argument is false, 
because arguing that position makes you a hypocrite’, to the ‘damning the origin’ fallacy: 
‘Your argument is false, because you have a vested interest in a certain conclusion’.  The 
quote below is probably a combination of the first and the last.        
 
The body of evidence is now so great that no reputable research centre questions 
the benefit and safety of this treatment in ADHD.  We realise there are still 
antidrug activists who claim medication is unhelpful and dangerous.  As educated 
adults we recognise the world is full of influential people who mislead through 
deliberate intent or through ignorance. (Green & Chee 1997: 124) 
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To paraphrase: those who question the use of Ritalin are disreputable, misleading, and/or 
idiots.  There is a strong theme through many of the medical responses to criticisms of 
pharmacological interventions into ADHD that only doctors have the right to participate 
in the debate.  In response to one journal article I had written on ADHD, I received a 
letter from a very unhappy child psychologist, asking me precisely what my qualifications 
were in psychology, and if I had none, to be quiet.  This is a variant on an Ad-Hominem 
fallacy. 
 
Of course, the source of any information should always be taken into account when 
assessing the soundness of an argument—that is, whether the premises are likely to be 
true, or what information may have been selected for presentation.  For instance, I have 
no interest in listening to arguments, or reviewing evidence, from members of the British 
Movement concerning their views on the holocaust. 
 
7) Red Herring Fallacy 
 
 Discussion about A, 
 Irrelevancy B introduced, under pretext of significance,  
So, Discussion no longer about A. 
 
When an argument is not going well, a common strategy is to try and subtly change the 
direction of the debate by introducing a topic which appears to be relevant to the initial 
subject, but is actually irrelevant to any of the previously addressed premises or 
conclusions.  This is a fallacy since, while it appears to be connected to the topic under 
discussion, it is simply a psychological device to deflect attention from an otherwise weak 
position.  
 
Judge Paul Conlon said attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) was the 
most over-diagnosed condition in the community with ‘naughty kids whacked’ on 
to drugs like the stimulant Ritalin, News Limited newspapers have reported.  But 
Australian Medical Association (AMA) vice-president Dr Choong-Siew Yong 
said … ‘untreated severe ADHD has consequences such as juvenile crime, failure 
at school, social breakdown and family breakdown,’ he told Sky News. ‘So the 
consequences of not treating severe ADHD are actually much more severe than 
using medication.’ (The Age 2007, 8) 
 
While not defending the judge’s somewhat overstated assertion in this example, the 
doctor responds with a classic red-herring.  The issue raise by the judge is whether Ritalin 
has some unwanted physical side-effects, but the doctor attempts to rebut this claim by 
talking about the disciplinary consequences of not providing the drug: ie. rampant social 
disorder.  An identical argument is often used within education when concerns are raised 
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about the dangers of prescribing stimulants to children: ie. what about the teachers, and 
the maintenance of an orderly classroom?  
 
8) Straw Man Fallacy 
 
 A is a sub-set of X, 
 A is a weak argument, and demonstrably false, 
So, X is false. 
 
In theoretical terms, a basic argument is organised around two premises and a conclusion.  
However, in more practical terms, a debate between two contrary positions usually 
involves a dialogue of successive arguments, each attempting to rebut the other.  Our 
adversarial legal system is built upon this process, where a good barrister attempts to 
anticipate opposing council’s arguments in advance, and defuse them during their own 
presentations.  By presenting a weak caricature of part of an opponent’s position, the 
entire broader argument can often be discredited.   This is a Straw Man fallacy.     
 
The greatest assault on stimulants was made in the late 1980s from an unexpected 
source, the Church of Scientology … This unexpected assault from a religious 
sub-group set back appropriate treatment of ADHD by years … Parents must still 
be on their guard as even today press releases and ‘letters to the editor’ continue 
to come from Scientology with antimedication attitudes. (Green & Chee 1997: 12-
13). 
 
The thrust of this quotation is that the primary criticism of pharmacological intervention 
into ADHD comes from the Scientologists—a rather obscure, and slightly cultish, 
religious sect.  Since this grouping also believes in space aliens, positing them as the 
vanguard of the anti-Ritalin brigade has the deliberate effect of drastically reducing the 
effectiveness of the opposition’s argument.  Indeed, the exceptionally dubious status of 
Scientology means that this argument shares some characteristics with an Ad-Hominem 
fallacy.  
 
Most academics would recognise the Straw Man fallacy.  Many of us would have felt the 
temptation to criticise relatively weak versions of positions we disagree with, rather than 
attack, head on, the sharpest end of the opposition.  Likewise, many of us would have 
hardly recognised feeble versions of our own theoretical allegiances (or indeed, our own 
work) kicked around in print by opponents, and from there, seen the entire position 
triumphantly damned. 
 
C) Logical Fallacies 
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Continuing the metaphor of the manufacturing process, the final remaining flaw in 
argument relates neither to the substance under manufacture, nor the errors of the 
machinist, but rather to the functioning of the machine itself.   That is, at this point of the 
process the concern is not upon the truth of the premises, per se, or the trick and errors of 
the arguer, but upon the structure of the argument.   
 
In this sense the process of searching for logical fallacies is almost mathematical in its 
operation, and focuses mostly upon the twin issues of validity—already discussed earlier 
in this paper—and logical truth.  Logical truth differs from empirical truth in that 
information external to the matter at hand is not required in order to make an evaluation.  
For example, the statement ‘My dog has three legs’ requires an empirical assessment of 
the said canine order to determine its truth, whereas the statement ‘My dog is not my dog’ 
requires no such assessment, as it is logically false.  After all, a ≠ not a. 
 
The four fallacies outlined here—Affirming the Consequent fallacy, the Begging the 
Question fallacy, the Suppressed Quantification fallacy, the Non-Sequitur fallacy—are all 
regularly employed within ADHD commentary and research.  Indeed, it has been 
contended that one particular example of the Begging the Question fallacy constitutes the 
logical foundation of the entire disorder.       
 
9) Affirming the Consequent Fallacy 
 
If A then B 
B 
So, A 
 
One of the most common form of arguments is the ‘if, then’ construction.  ‘If I run out of 
petrol, then the car will stop’.  Therefore, following this logic, since I have run out of 
petrol, the car has stopped.  A logical error occurs when the reverse assumption is made: 
if the second part of the construction is true (ie. affirming the consequent), then this 
proves the antecedent.  ‘If the car has stopped, then I have run out of petrol’.  This may 
well still be true, but it is not necessarily true.  The car may have stopped because I put 
my foot on the brake, or because it stalled, or because I drove it into a wall.   
 
Q: My 10 year old and I have ADHD, is my hyperactive 4 year old too young to 
diagnose? 
A: Absolutely not! Your 4 year old has a VERY good chance of having ADHD and is 
not too young to diagnose or treat. (YouQA: 2008)   
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There are a number of logical problems here, indeed this could also come under the 
umbrella of a Hasty Generalisation fallacy, as well as Affirming the Consequent.  Putting 
aside the somewhat dubious status of ADHD, it is not only bad logic, but also bad 
medicine/psychology, to extrapolate one symptom backwards to diagnose a disease.  
However, the main issue here is the logic that as A and B have ADHD, and are therefore 
hyperactive: C is hyperactive, so C must have ADHD—ie. affirming the consequent..   
 
The Affirming the Consequent fallacy involving the ADHD-hyperactivity nexus has 
become one of the signal faulty assumptions of the modern classroom.  Children who 
show excessive signs of life in the classroom seem to be quickly pigeon-holed into the 
ADHD basket.  Other options, both in terms of explanations for their conduct and 
strategies for dealing with the ensuing disruption, become subordinate to the all-
encompassing ADHD/Ritalin duopoly.       
 
 
10) Begging the Question Fallacy (circular reasoning) 
 
 Why A?  
Because of B, 
 Why B? 
 Because of A 
 
In constructing a valid argument, involving the familiar components of premises and a 
conclusion, the premises must be independent of the conclusion.  That is, a conclusion 
cannot be regarded as valid if it is reached by the use of premises which have already 
assumed the truth of that conclusion, the very issue the argument was set up to determine.  
To put it another way, begging the question largely consists of an attempt to support an 
assertion by simply repeating that assertion in a different way.  In the argument: 
‘Astrology is true’—‘How can you be sure?’—‘Because I’m a cancer, and we are 
perceptive about these things’, the conclusion is simply a more complex version of the 
initial premise, ie.  astrology is true, because astrology is true.   
 
How do you know a child has Attention Deficit Disorder (ADHD)? Because he’s 
impulsive and out of his seat.  Why is he impulsive and out of his seat?  Because 
he has ADHD. (Weist et al. 1999: 121) 
 
This is the classic example of circular reasoning, in that the argument refers to nothing 
outside of itself.  This should not be surprising, as in spite of all the research conducted 
into ADHD over the last twenty years, there still appears to be no concrete, objective 
evidence of an identifiable physical condition (Jacobs, 2002).  With nothing for ADHD to 
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be actually tied to, all that remains are observations about behaviour, which then act as 
both an indicator of, and the defining criteria for, that initial disorder.  
 
 
 
11) Suppressed Quantification Fallacy 
 
 Some A is B, 
 The ‘some’ is omitted, 
 A is B 
So, All A is B. 
 
Logical constructions often use the quantifier ‘some’, as in ‘some A is B’.  This covers all 
the ground between ‘no A is B’, to ‘all A is B’.  In this instance, ‘some’ can cover 
anything from ‘a few’, to ‘several’, ‘a number of’, ‘many’, or ‘most’.  However, if this 
quantifier is removed, all that remains is ‘A is B’, which can be more accurately written 
as ‘All A is B’.  Such fallacies succeed in erroneously turning the uncertain, into the 
undisputed.     
 
Top 10 Questions about ADHD Drugs … Answered! 
1. How can I tell if my child really needs ADD drugs? 
Experts agree that medication should be considered for any child whose 
symptoms of attention deficit disorder (ADD, ADHD) interfere with his 
social, emotional, or academic life. (McCarthy 2007: 1) 
 
Experts Agree: ADHD is a Valid Disorder.   
A remarkable international consensus confirms that ADHD is a real and valid 
disorder. (Hurley & Eme 2004, 2) 
 
Which experts? How many … a couple? Quite a lot?  These questions become redundant 
with the argument constructed as it is, since the implication immediately become that all 
experts think Ritalin is the way to go for ADHD, or that all experts regard ADHD as 
ontologically valid.  Although both these claims are very far from the truth, it is a 
common way of (mis)representing the information. Dissenting voices are magically 
erased from the debate, or immediately reclassified as ‘non-expert’.      
 
12) Non-Sequitur Fallacy 
 
 All A is B 
 All B is C 
So, D 
 
In many ways, the term ‘non-sequitur’ (does not follow) is a catch-all phrase which can 
cover most fallacies of argument.  If the conclusion to an argument is not a valid 
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conclusion—that is, it is not a logical consequence of the premises—then it ‘does not 
follow.’  It is a non-sequitur.  More specifically, however, this term is usually applied to a 
conclusion that is largely unconnected to what went before it.  This conclusion may well 
be part of the same generalised discussion, but nothing in the preceding statements can be 
considered to provide satisfactory supporting evidence for it.    
 
… given Ritalin’s quick action (it can ‘calm’ children within days after treatment 
starts), some doctors even rely on the drug as a diagnostic tool, interpreting 
improvements in behaviour or attention as proof of an underlying ADHD. 
(Bromfield 1996: 24)  
 
This is a surprisingly common argument: Ritalin helps with hyperactivity, hyperactivity is 
a symptom of ADHD, therefore ADHD is a valid disorder.  This conclusion is not related 
to the two premises.  The fact that Ritalin acts to calm some forms of hyperactivity, does 
not mean that ADHD is somehow magically confirmed as an independent disease entity.  
No-one is disputing that some individuals are more ‘hyper-kinetic’ than others, or that 
amphetamines, for all the problems associated with their provision, do ameliorate some 
aspects of this hyper-kinesis, however neither of these conclusions logically lead to the 
conclusion that ADHD exists. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The central aims of this paper have been twofold: first, to restate the importance of the 
ability to spot phoney arguments when we are confronted with them.  Twelve fallacies 
have been addressed here—categorised variously as material, psychological and logical—
but there are also dozens of others, most clearly discussed in any good book on logic.  
These include fallacies such as Hasty Generalisation, False Conversion of Propositions, 
Amphibole, The Gambler’s Mistake, and No True Scotsman, to name but a few.  These 
are equally important, in a general sense, although perhaps not as applicable to the issue 
of ADHD. 
 
The second aim has been to demonstrate the frailty of many of the arguments used to 
support ADHD.  Some are of only passing importance, but arguably others go to the very 
core of the disorder.  There is the contemporary assumption that very active children 
simply must have ADHD (Affirming the Consequent), there is the proof of the existence 
of ADHD by the fact that Ritalin clearly deals with its symptoms (Non-Sequitur), and 
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most importantly, there are the symptoms of ADHD which both explain the disorder, and 
are explained by it (Begging the Question).      
 
It should be pointed out that ADHD is by no means the only behaviour disorder 
vulnerable to this kind of criticism, far from it.  It is, however, by far the most diagnosed 
and well-known of them all.  Virtually any of a hundred other contemporary disorders—
Borderline Personality Disorder, Oppositional Defiance Disorder, Conduct Disorder, 
Antisocial Personality Disorder, Intermitted Explosive Disorder—are equally 
questionable in their use of logic.  As I have argued extensively elsewhere, this tidal wave 
of modern behaviour disorders has much more to do with the pathologisation of conduct, 
and the governance of populations, than it has with any ontological validity.    
 
Finally, and to reiterate a point made at the beginning of this paper, my own record for 
producing fallacy-free argument is far from impeccable.  A brief review of my own work 
over the years has produced several wobbly constructions, most notably some Hasty 
Generalisations, a couple of Red Herrings and the occasional Straw Man, so I am more 
than aware how easy it is to make these kinds of logical errors.  Moreover, advocates of 
ADHD might argue that this entire paper has an element of the Straw Man fallacy about 
it, in that I have not necessarily chosen the most sophisticated of commentary to make my 
case, as anticipated in the observations on fallacy No. 8.  While this latter observation 
might have an element of truth about it, it is ultimately irrelevant, as the examples I have 
chosen accurately illustrate the dominant arguments employed when discussing the 
disorder.  Not only are they regularly used within the academy, they are also the most 
common discourses employed at the twin coalfaces of the classroom and the living 
room—and more often than not, they are fallacious.  Hopefully, pointing this out will 
give those who employ this category, either in their professional or family life, pause for 
thought.   
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